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In his customary, penetrating way, Professor Brown has discovered and illuminated a 
fascinating admissibility paradox. This paradox brings together the elusive concept of 
ancillarity with the (still somewhat puzzling) Stein phenomenon and, through this synthesis, 
perhaps explains both a little better. The goal in this discussion is to understand and explain 
Brown's admissibility paradox in a. simple intuitive way. 
Using the notation of Section 3, we observe Ynx1 and Vnxr' where EY = a1 + V{3, and 
we want to estimate a using an estimator that is a function of Y and V, say d(Y,V). The loss 
function, given by (3.1.2) is squared error loss, 
(1) L(a,d) =(a- d)2 • 
In a. regression problem, we estimate a based on observing values Y=y and V=v. Brown's 
paradox asserts that the admissibility of&, the least squares estimator, depends on whether V 
is treated a.s constant or as a. realized value of a.n ancillary random variable. 
An important distinction between the two problems lies in the risk functions: although 
the loss function remains the same, the risk function changes depending on whether we 
consider the matrix V to be fixed or random. If V is flxed, then the risk of estimating a is 
conditional on the value V=v, that is, 
(2) 
Here the expectation is over the distribution of Y given V=v which, of course, depends on a. 
If V is considered a random variable, then the risk of estimating a is unconditional on the 
value V=v, that is 
(3) R(a,d) = J R(a,diV=v)fy(v)dv, 
where fy( ·) denotes the density of V. 
Keeping the risk relationship (3) in mind, we can now reexamine the 
admissibility /inadmissibility results of Proposition 3.1.1 and Theorem 3.2.2 (or their 
predecessors, Proposition 2.1.1 and Theorem 2.1.2). The admissibility results relate to the risk 
function R(a,diV=v) of (2), while the inadmissibility results relate to the risk function R(a,d) 
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of (3). Furthermore, the relationship in (3) amplifies the paradoxical nature of Brown's 
results. Note that, from (3), we immediately get the implication that if an estimator d(Y, v) is 
dominated for every v by d*(Y ,v) using R(o:,dlV=v) of (2), it is inadmissible under 
R( o:,d(Y,V)) of (3). But this does not happen for d(Y, v) = a. Since least squares estimator 
is admissible under R(o:,aiV=v), this implies that it cannot be dominated in risk for every v 
by the same estimator. 
We therefore see that the inadmissibility of o: under R( o:,a) is really tied to the 
distribution of V. Since the estimator a cannot be dominated for each V=v, the domination is 
through the integration against fy(v). The dominating estimators (such as those in Section 
3.3) must improve greatly for values of v yielding large values of fy(v), for the risk must 
surely be larger than that of a for other values of v. The distribution of the ancillary statistic 
is central to the dominance result. (Consider an analogous, although different, occurrence in 
the classic Stein problem of estimating a multivariate normal mean. Although the usual 
estimator can be dominated using sum-of-squared-errors loss, it cannot be dominated 
componentwise. Thus, on some loss components the improved estimators must offer a large 
improvement, since they surely will lose on other components.) 
The influence of the ancillary statistic V, or of any conditioning statistic, can also be seen 
through the following decomposition. For any estimator d(Y,V), the risk given by (3), R(o:,d) 
= E[o:- d(Y,V)] 2 , can be decomposed into 
(4) 
Although this decomposition works for any conditioning statistic, risk improvement will obtain 
only if the statistic behaves in a certain way. In order to improve on the unconditional risk 
(the left-hand side of (4)), knowing that the conditional risk (the first term on the right-hand 
r 
side) cannot always be improved, the variance of the estimator, with respect to the 
conditioning statistic, must behave correctly. For the estimator d to dominate a we must 
have 
(5)0 $ R(o:,a)- R(o:,d) = E[( o:- E(&IV) r- ( o:- E(diV) rJ + E[Var(&IV) - Var(diV)], 
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so dominance requires that the statistic V imparts the correct influence on the variance 
(precision) of the estimator d. 
Another remark of Brown's becomes clearer when seen in the light of equation (3) 
together with the admissibility of & using R(n,diV=v). In Remark 4.3.2 it is conjectured that 
& remains admissible if the mean of V is unknown, but is inadmissible if this mean can be 
independently estimated. From equation (3) we know that & is only inadmissible when the 
risk function R(n,&IV=v) is integrated against fy(v). Hence, this distribution (or some 
independent estimate of it) must be known for the inadmissibility result to hold. In the case 
considered here fy(v) is a member of a parametric family, so only the parameters need to be 
known. 
Another explanation of Brown's ancillarity paradox, one that is more closely tied to Stein 
estimation, emerged from discussions with David Lansky, a Cornell graduate student. If we 
look more closely at Brown's Lemma 3.3.1, we can write (using the definition of 6 and P in 
(3.3.1)) 
(6) E(n- &)2 - E(n- 6)2 = E[C.B- P)'V'V(P - P)]- E[CP - fJ)'V'V(P - P)]. 
Notice that equation (6) is valid whether V is fixed or random, and links the dominance of & 
by 6 under squared error loss to the dominance of p by P under weighted squared error loss. 
If V is random, we can further simplify the expectation on the right-hand side of (6), 
and obtain Lemma 3.3.1. If V is fixed, however, the term V'V cannot be removed_ from the 
right-hand side of equation (6). Furthermore, the matrix V'V is of rank one, making the 
right-hand side of (6) equivalent to a one dimensional risk difference. In such a case it is well 
known that P is admissible. Thus, in the case of fixed V the estimation of a is a one 
dimensional problem, but if V is random the assumption that E(V'V) = I/n turns the 
estimation of a into a multivariate problem (and leads to the inadmissibility results). 
Although this argument is restricted to the class of estimators given in (3.3.1), it clearly shows 
the influence of V on the admissibility of n. 
Perhaps one of the most important effects of Brown's work will be the rethinking of the 
notion of ancillarity. Fisher, in his wonderfully vague way, left us with this idea of ancillarity, 
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but not with any unequivocal definition. (The article by Buehler {1982) ably demonstrates 
this.) The main problem seems to be that ancillarity is defined by a marginal distribution, 
fy{v), when the more useful definition would be in terms of a conditional distribution, 
fyly(Yiv). This idea may be closer to how Fisher thought of ancillaries, for he was most 
interested in the case where the pair {Y,V) is a sufficient statistic {but Y alone is not), and the 
marginal distribution of V does not depend on the parameter of interest. In such cases Fisher 
recommended using fyiV(ylv) for inference. The major reason for this, which bears on the 
reasoning behind {4) and {5), is that the ancillary statistic contains information about 
precision. Fisher {1936) states "Ancillary information never modifies the value of our 
estimate; it determines its precision." 
Connecting ancillarity with precision is a subtly different notion from that expressed by 
Brown in the first paragraph of his introduction. The quote from Savage, in Section 5, is 
closer to this sentiment, since ihe values of the independent variable have a direct impact on 
precision. In Brown's examination of the influence of ancillary statistics, he has substituted 
"admissibility" for "precision", bringing new understanding to this elusive concept. (Some 
problems with the influence of ancillarity on ·precision are discussed by Basu 1964, 1981.) 
Rather than classify a statistic as ancillary or otherwise, a more useful categorization may 
be whether the statistic can influence an inference. This notion can also be traced back to 
Fisher, and is made mathematically precise by Robinson (1979). Although Robinson_is mainly 
concerned with conditional inference from confidence statements, conditional evaluations can 
also be tied into admissibility of point estimators. A decomposition such as ( 4) shows that the 
usual definition of ancillarity is not strong enough to be of use in decision theory. We need to 
take into account the conditional distribution of Y given V, and the effect that V has on the 
precision of our estimator. This consideration is, perhaps, equivalent to what Brown means in 
the last sentence of his article. 
-6-
References 
Basu, D. (1964). Recovery of ancillary information. In Contributions to Statistics, 
Pergammon Press, Oxford, pp. 7-20. Republished in Sankhya 26 (1964), 3-16. Also in 
Statistical Information and Likelihood, A Collection of Critical Essays by Dr. D. Basu 
(1988). J. K. Ghosh, ed., Springer-Verlag, New York. 
Basu, D. {1981). On ancillary statistics, pivotal quantities, and confidence statements. In 
Topics in Applied Statistics, Y. P. Chaubey and T. D. Disivedi, eds. Concordia 
University, Montreal, 1-29. Also in Statistical Information and Likelihood, A Collection 
of Critical Essays by Dr. D. Basu (1988). J. K. Ghosh, ed., Springer-Verlag, New York. 
Buehler, R. (1982). Some ancillary statistics and their properties (with discussion). J. Amer. 
Statist. Assoc. 77, 581-593. 
Fisher, R. A. (1936). Uncertain inference. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences 71, 245-258. 
Robinson, G. K. (1979). Condition properties of statistical procedures. Ann. Statist. 7, 742-
755. 
